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Casenotes
MULTIPLE CHARACTERIZATIONS FOR THE SINGLE ENTITY
ARGUMENT?: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT THROWS AN
AIRBALL IN CHICAGO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP v. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Much to the purist sports fan's chagrin, sports in today's soci-
ety revolves around money.' Owners are faced with the difficult
task of finding increasing sources of revenue to offset what they
perceive as the alarming trend of escalating players' salaries. 2
Broadcasting rights to sporting events is one revenue source that
has grown by leaps and bounds over the past two decades.3
1. See Erik Brady & Debbie Howlett, Who's Paying for Ballpark Binge? You Are,
SrnT-rE TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at D5. Before the year 2000, 45 new stadiums and
arenas will be built, costing over nine billion dollars. See id. Owners frequently
move teams to other cities to cash in on a better financial offer. See id. The St.
Louis Rams (formerly the Los Angeles Rams), Oakland Raiders (who moved from
Oakland to Los Angeles, back to Oakland), Baltimore Ravens (formerly the Cleve-
land Browns) and Tennessee Oilers (formerly the Houston Oilers) all have moved
in the last two seasons. See id. In addition, the Seattle Seahawks are threatening to
move to Los Angeles. See id. The concept of loyalty to fans has evaporated in the
rush to build new stadiums with high-priced luxury boxes. See Robert Draper,
Spoils Sports, TEX. MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 1996, at 110. One estimate has 38 owners, from
each of the four major professional sports, playing the stadium blackmail game,
where loyalty to a city means little and a team typically belongs to the city with the
highest bid. See id.
2. See Mark Montieth, New Arena Means Suite Success for Revenue-Searching Pacers,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 18, 1996, at BI. Indiana Pacers president Donnie Walsh
recently received a letter from a season ticket holder telling him he had to re-sign
Pacers' star guard Reggie Miller. See id. Walsh wondered if the fan would be will-
ing to pay three times his season ticket price, because Miller's salary will most likely
triple as well. See id. This is an example of the crisis that faces all National Basket-
ball Association (NBA) teams right now. See id. Salaries are increasing dramati-
cally, but the fans can only shoulder so much of the burden before they stop
buying tickets. See id.
The anticipated size of Miller's raise has become the status quo. Escalating
players' salaries have become a sports-wide epidemic, evidenced by the fact that
the average professional baseball player's salary rose from $600,000 to over
$1,000,000 in just two years. See David M. Van Glish, The Future of Sports Broadcast-
ing and Pay-Per-View: An Antitrust Analysis, 1 SPoRTs L. J. 79, 82 (1994),
3. The broadcast rights to the summer Olympic Games sold for $25 million in
1976, compared to the $456 million that NBC paid for the 1996 Games. See Money
and the Olympics: 'Amateurs' Mostly a Myth, USA TODAY, July 27, 1996, at A14. In
addition, the broadcast rights to baseball cost $1.7 billion over the next five years,
the NBA's four year deal is worth $1.1 billion, the National Football League has a
four-year deal worth $4 billion, and the American Broadcasting Company (ABC)
(73)
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The importance of broadcasting rights cannot be overstated.
The money paid for these rights can fuel the growth of a fledgling
sport or league. 4 From a broadcaster's view, the ownership of
broadcasting rights can increase exposure and even help to define
a network.5 The magnitude of broadcasting rights is also evidenced
by the bidding wars that often accompany their acquisition, 6 in ad-
dition to the divisive effects they can have on the sports themselves. 7
The National Basketball Association (NBA), which sells the
broadcasting rights to its games, would ordinarily be subject to anti-
trust laws in the formation of such contracts. 8 This is not the case
in professional sports broadcasting, however, because Congress has
tailored a specific exception to the antitrust laws, known as the
will broadcast college football's championship game for the next seven years for
over $500 million. See Thomas Bonk, Olympic TVIs a Cash Register, L.A. TIMES, July
26, 1996, at C1.
4. See Chris Sheridan, As NBA Turns 50, Stern Focuses on the Future, RoCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 27, 1996, at C15. Interest in watching NBA games has in-
creased substantially since 1979. See id. In that year, NBA games could not gener-
ate enough ratings to be broadcast in prime time and the NBA Finals were shown
via tape delay. See id. Now games are viewed in 170 countries in 44 languages. See
id. In addition, the league has over 100 different television deals. See id.
Major League Soccer (MLS) demonstrated the importance of broadcast rights
in a rather unusual way. See Stefan Fatsis, Major League Soccer Does Well in U.S. Debut,
WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct. 21, 1996, at 13. The league is paying the Entire Sports
Network (ESPN) and ABC to broadcast its games through 1998, at which point the
league hopes that a steady ratings increase will produce a big payoff. See id. After
the 1998 season, the league commissioner believes that broadcasting rights will be
the biggest stream of revenue. See id.
5. See Matthew Rose, New Sports Highlights Service Heats up Off-Field Competition,
WALL ST.J. EUROPE, Oct. 7, 1996, at 8. Sports News Television (SNTV) is attempt-
ing to negotiate broadcast rights to enable it to become the world's first "exclusive
niche marketer" of sports highlights. Id. The station's plan was unsuccessful dur-
ing the 1996 Summer Olympics, however, because television news crews not associ-
ated with the $900 million broadcast rights agreement were not allowed to
transmit highlights until up to a day after the event was finished. See id. See also
Larry Lebowitz, Dolphins Join WQAM in Three-Team Package; All-Sports Station Pays
$35 Million for Five Years, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 30, 1996 (low-
rated AM station purchases radio rights for Miami Dolphins, Florida Marlins and
Florida Panthers in bid to establish itself as "market's radio sports leader").
6. See Stefan Fatsis & Elizabeth Jensen, ABC Sets Deal for Football Championship,
WALL ST.J.,July 24, 1996, at A3. Fox spent $395 million to purchase rights for NFL
ames from longtime broadcaster CBS. See id. Moreover, ABC initially offered
399 million for college football's big four bowl games, but was forced to increase
its bid to $500 million. See id.
7. See Robes Patton, Labor Snag Delays Riley's Free-Agent Shopping Spree, SUN-SEN-
TINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.),July 10, 1996, at C1. The NBA free-agent signing pe-
riod was briefly delayed following the imposition of a lockout which lasted only
eight minutes. See id. The disruption was due to a dispute over how to share the
profits from the television contract between the NBA, the National Broadcasting
Company (NBC) and Turner Network Television (TNT). See id.
8. For a discussion of how the antitrust laws apply to sports in general and
basketball specifically, see infra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
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Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA).9 The SBA was designed to permit
leagues to sell broadcasting rights without the scrutiny that similar
contracts in other settings receive. 10 In addition, if the NBA is a
single entity, it cannot violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act and is free to negotiate restrictions in television contracts.11
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of broadcast rights in the context of the Sports
Broadcasting Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act in Chicago Profes-
sional Sports Limited Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n (NBA I-
A). 12 In NBA I-A, the Seventh Circuit concluded that when acting
in the broadcast market, the NBA was closer to a single entity than a
joint venture. 13 The court went on to speculate that a professional
sports league may be a single entity for some purposes and a joint
venture for others. 14
This Note focuses on the Seventh Circuit's single entity analy-
sis. Section II describes the facts that gave rise to NBA I-A.15 Sec-
tion III discusses the Sherman Antitrust Act and the circumstances
leading to the adoption of the Sports Broadcasting Act as an excep-
tion to the Sherman Antitrust Act.16 The Seventh Circuit's analysis
and disposition of the issues are covered in detail in Section IV.17
Section V analyzes the reasoning behind the Seventh Circuit's deci-
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-95 (1996). For the pertinent text of the Act, see infra
note 112.
10. For a discussion of the Sports Broadcasting Act, see infra notes 112-19 and
accompanying text.
11. The designation of single entity is crucial "since, by definition, a single
entity cannot contract, combine, or conspire with itself." Lori J. Brown, Note, The
Battle: From the Playing Field to the Courtroom - United States Football League v.
National Football League, 18 U. TOL. L. REv. 871, 895 n.235 (quoting GovERN-
MENT AND SPORT, THE PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 149 (A. Johnson &J. Frey eds. 1985)).
For a discussion of the single entity issue and how courts have characterized
professional sports leagues, see infra notes 77-111 and accompanying text.
12. 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
13. See id. at 600. A joint venture can violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act
while a single entity cannot because a Section 1 violation requires a plurality of
actors, which a single entity obviously lacks. See Michael L. Denger et al., Vertical
Price, Customer and Territorial Limitations, 890 PLI/CoRP. 505, 507 (1995). For a
more in-depth discussion of the importance of the single entity issue, see infra
notes 77-111 and accompanying text.
14. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 600. The court acknowledged that while the NBA
might be a single entity for the purpose of selling broadcast rights, it might also be
a joint venture in the recruitment of players. See id.
15. For a discussion of the facts in NBA I-A, see infra notes 20-33 and accom-
panying text.
16. For a discussion of the background of the Sports Broadcasting Act and the
Sherman Act, see infra notes 34-119 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the court's analysis and holding in NBA II-A, see infra
notes 120-91 and accompanying text.
1998]
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sion.18 In conclusion, Section VI explores the impact of NBA II-A
on future suits against professional sports leagues.' 9
II. FACTS
The NBA limits the number of NBA games that may be broad-
cast over "superstations," which are independent, over-the-air televi-
sion stations that broadcast in their local markets and are also
available on other cable systems across the country.2 0 The NBA's
rules, including those applicable to broadcast limitations, are voted
on by the NBA's Board of Governors, which consists of one repre-
sentative from each team.2 ' Prior to the 1990-91 season, each team
was permitted to televise up to twenty-five games on a superstation,
but a new rule was adopted for the 1990-91 season which reduced
that number to twenty.22 Chicago Professional Sports Limited Part-
nership (Bulls), the entity that owns the NBA's Chicago Bulls,
claimed that the reduction violated antitrust law and sought an in-
junction to allow them to continue to sell the rights to twenty-five
games.23 After a five day trial, the district court granted the Bulls
and WGN the injunction, which prevented the NBA from enforcing
18. For an analysis of the court's reasoning, see infra notes 192-212 and ac-
companying text.
19. For a discussion of the impact of NBA I-A, see infra notes 213-17 and
accompanying text.
20. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n
(NBA 1), 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1338 (N.D. Ill. 1991). Besides WGN in Chicago, other
examples of superstations include WTBS in Atlanta and WWOR in New York. See
id.
The FCC defines superstations as "local broadcast stations within their local
markets and.., national cable networks outside of their local markets." Brett T.
Goodman, The Sports Broadcasting Act: As Anachronistic as the Dumont Network?, 5
SETON HALLJ. SPoRT L. 469, 485-86 (1995).
21. See NBA I, 754 F. Supp. at 1338. NBA teams pool and market some of
their television rights. See id. at 1340. At the time this case initially went to trial,
each team received $6.8 million dollars in shared revenue from the national televi-
sion contract. See id. In addition, each team may broadcast half (41) of its regular
season games on any non-superstation, over-the-air television station within its
home territory. See id. at 1344. The team keeps all the revenue from such broad-
casts. See id. With very few limits, a team may broadcast any number of games on
local cable stations within 75 miles of the team's home city. See id. The team also
retains all of this revenue. See id.
22. See id. at 1338, 1344. The reduction cost the Chicago Bulls approximately
$640,000, based on the $128,000 a game that WGN paid in 1989-90, the first year
of its contract with the Bulls. See id. at 1348.
23. See id. at 1338-39. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. (WGN), the super-
station to which the Bulls licensed its 25 games, also joined the suit. See id. at 1338.
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the new restriction on superstation broadcasts. 24 The injunction
was upheld by the Seventh Circuit.25
Despite the twenty-five game limit specified in the injunction,
the NBA allowed the Bulls to broadcast thirty games on WGN for
the 1991-92, 1992-93, and 1993-94 seasons.26 The NBA allowed only
twenty-five games, the number mandated by the injunction, for the
1994-95 season.27
In 1993, the NBA restructured its contracts in an attempt to
take advantage of some of the suggestions in the Seventh Circuit's
1992 opinion (NBA I-A). 28 The league transferred all broadcast
rights to the National Broadcast Company (NBC) in a contract that
24. See id. at 1339.
25. See Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n
(NBA I-A), 961 F.2d 667, 677 (7th Cir. 1992). The court noted that the NBA had
not offered an adequate reason to overrule the district court. See id. at 677. The
court did, however, acknowledge that the NBA might have been hampered by the
speed of the litigation. See id. at 676. The court said "this case went to decision
like greased lightning. Seven weeks from complaint to trial is unheard of in anti-
trust litigation .... If litigation ought not resemble a marathon, neither is the 100-
yard dash a good model." Id.
26. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n
(NBA I/), 874 F. Supp. 844, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
27. See id.
28. See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n
(NBA I-A), 95 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1996). The suggestions of the Seventh Cir-
cuit included:
1. Establish that the league is a "single entity" so that whatever it does is
unreviewable ....
2. Transfer all team copyrights to the NBA.
3. Invoke the protection of the SBA by transferring all telecast rights of
NBA games whether national or local to the NBA and then put a cap on
the number of national telecasts of NBA games in the contracts with NBC
and Turner.
4. Demonstrate that a limitation on the distribution of Bull's games on
WGN "expands output, serves the interests of consumers and should be
applauded rather than condemned." (citation omitted). To do this, the
court suggested that the NBA might try to establish that keeping popular
games off superstations helped weaker teams attract support of their local
audiences and increase their gate receipts, which is a principal source of
team revenues, while at the same time attracting larger audiences, an ex-
pansion of output.
5. Attempt to establish that the elimination of all Bulls' games on WGN
will cause WGN and the Bulls to suffer no "antitrust injury," i.e., loss that
comes "from acts that reduce output or raise prices to consumers." (cita-
tion omitted).
6. Have the league impose a superstation fee or tax which would produce
income for the teams since it would be shared equally and would elimi-
nate any "free-riding" by the Bulls and WGN.
NBA II, 874 F. Supp. at 847.
The district court noted these suggestions with disapproval, stating that they
"effectively eliminated the very real possibility of a negotiated settlement of the
case." Id.
1998]
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also permitted eighty-five games to be broadcast on superstations. 29
Since the NBA licensed seventy of these games to the Turner super-
stations (Turner Broadcasting System (TBS) and Turner Network
Television (TNT)), WGN would only be allowed to broadcast fif-
teen games.30 The Bulls chose to ignore the fifteen game limitation
and instead sold thirty games to WGN.31 Following a nine-week
trial, the district court modified the injunction, increasing the
number of superstation games to thirty.3 2 Both sides appealed.33
III. BACKGROUND
A. Sherman Act
1. History of the Sherman Act and Its Applicability to Professional
Sports Leagues
In 1889, Senator Sherman introduced the Sherman Bill, which
he declared was a "bill to declare unlawful, trusts and combinations
in restraint of trade and production."34 This bill was never passed,
however, and a more comprehensive version, written by Senator
George F. Hoar of Massachussetts, was substituted with Senator
Sherman's approval.35 Congress passed the Sherman Act in 1890
as a response to an increasing trend of mergers.3 6 With its major
29. See NBA II-A, 95 F.3d at 595. Under this contract, each team had the right
to broadcast all 82 games, 41 over the air and 41 on cable. See id. For an explana-
tion of the television broadcast rules, see supra note 21.
30. See NBA II-A, 95 F.3d at 595.
31. See id. The Bulls took the position that the 30 games were authorized in
the NBC contract as over-the-air broadcasts, in addition to being authorized by the
injunction. See id. The Bulls did make one concession: no Bulls game would be
broadcast on WGN the same time as a game on a Turner superstation. See id. at
595-96.
32. See Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball Ass'n
(NBA II-A), 95 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 1996). The court chose thirty games, be-
cause for three seasons the NBA voluntarily allowed the Bulls to broadcast that
many. See NBA II, 874 F. Supp. at 869. The court noted that this agreement did
not have a negative impact on the league; rather, the evidence indicated the agree-
ment may have had a positive impact. See id. Therefore, the court concluded that
a reduction below thirty games would be unreasonable. See id.
33. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 595. The Bulls wanted to broadcast 41 games on
WGN, while the NBA insisted that a lower number of games (15 or 20) was consis-
tent with antitrust laws. See id.
34. ALBERT H. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAw 2 (Greenwood Press
1980) (quoting 51 CONG. REc. 96 (1889)).
35. See id. Both houses passed Senator Hoar's version without amendment,
but it was entitled the Sherman Act due to Senator Sherman's leading role in the
proposal of such a law. See id.
36. See Michael D. Belsley, The Vatican Merger Defense - Should Two Catholic
Hospitals Seeking to Merge Be Considered a Single Entity for Purposes of Antitrust Merger
Analysis?, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 720, 730 (1996). According to Judge Posner, the Act
[Vol. 5: p. 73
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provisions in Section One and Two,37 the principal purpose of the
Sherman Act is to promote competition.38
Initially, courts did not apply antitrust laws to professional
sports because they believed that professional sports teams and
leagues were not engaged in interstate commerce.3 9 The Supreme
Court expressed this view in 1922, holding that baseball games were
"purely state affairs," despite the fact that interstate travel was in-
volved.40 While this characterization of professional sports may
was passed "against a background of rampant cartelization and monopolization of
the American economy." See id. at 729.
Senator Sherman reflected his view that economic power was synonymous
with political domination when he said:
If the concentrated powers of this combination are intrusted to a single
man, it is a kingly prerogative, inconsistent with our form of government,
and should be subject to the strong resistance of the State and national
authorities. If anything is wrong this is wrong. If we will not endure a
king as a political power we should not endure a king over the produc-
tion, transportation, and sale of the necessaries of life. If we would not
submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with
power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity.
Keith Conrad, Media Mergers: First Step in a New Shift of Antitrust Analysis?, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 675, 685-86 (1997) (quoting 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (statement of
Sen. Sherman)).
37. Section One provides in pertinent part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997).
Section Two provides in pertinent part, "[e]very person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire ... to monopolize.., shall
be deemed guilty of a felony . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
38. See Don Shacknai, Sports Broadcasting and the Antitrust Laws: Stay Tuned for
Baseball After the Bulls Romp in Court, 1 SPoRTs L. 1, 4 (1994). The Supreme Court,
in summarizing the purpose of the act, stated:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of eco-
nomic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conductive to
the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But
even were that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid
down by the Act is competition.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
39. See Michael Jay Kaplan, Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Professional
Sports, 18 A.L.R. Fed. 489, 495 (1974) (noting that baseball had "relatively slight"
impact on interstate commerce and that game was "in a real sense, a local
exhibition").
40. Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Prof'l Baseball
Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208-09 (1922). The Court viewed the constant travelling as
incidental to commerce. See id. at 209. By way of analogy, the Court reasoned that
1998]
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have been appropriate in the early twenties, the landscape of pro-
fessional sports dramatically changed over the following three de-
cades.41 In 1953, the Supreme Court upheld the 1922 decision,
declaring that Congress "had no intention of including the business
of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws."'42 In
reaching this decision, the Court noted that baseball had developed
for thirty years under the assumption that antitrust laws did not ap-
ply to it.43 This exemption from the antitrust laws is unique to base-
ball, since antitrust laws do apply to other sports such as boxing,
football and basketball. 44
2. The Rule of Reason and Per Se Illegality
Taken literally, all contracts would violate the Sherman Act,45
but the Supreme Court has interpreted the language to prohibit
only those agreements which unreasonably restrain trade.46 Ordi-
narily the "Rule of Reason" is the analytical tool courts use to deter-
mine if an agreement unreasonably restrains trade, but in limited
circumstances, a rule of per se illegality applies. 47 Under the rule
of per se illegality, some agreements are considered so harmful to
a law firm does not participate in interstate commerce simply because one of its
lawyers goes to another state to argue a case. See id.
41. See generally, Kaplan, supra note 39, at 495 (contrasting relative simplicity
of baseball in 1920s with sophistication of 1950s).
42. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
43. See id. at 357. In addition, the Court indicated that Congress' silence on
the matter in the aftermath of the ruling constituted acquiescence. See id. The
Court did not rule out the possibility that there were "evils" in baseball that should
be rectified by the Sherman Act, but did express a preference for a legislative,
rather than a judicial, solution. Id.
44. See Kaplan, supra note 39, at 495-96 (citing Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
282-83 (1972)). The Court, in Flood, presumed that in addition to boxing, football
and basketball, antitrust laws also applied to hockey and golf. Flood, 407 U.S. at
283.
In 1971, the Court recognized that the antitrust laws applied to basketball.
Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971). In Haywood, a
player contested the NBA rule which prohibited drafting any player until four
years after his high school graduation. See id. at 1204. The Supreme Court, recog-
nizing that the NBA was subject to the antitrust laws, characterized the rule as a
group boycott in violation of the Sherman Act and reinstated the District Court's
injunction which allowed Haywood to play. See id. at 1205-07.
45. See Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918). The Court recognized that "every agreement concerning trade, every reg-
ulation of trade, restrains." Id.
46. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
47. See Michael D. Blechman, Relationship Among Competitors, 941 PLI/CoRP. 7,
12 (1996) (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). For a
discussion of the per se rule and its decreasing role in antitrust analysis, see infra
notes 52-65 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the Rule of Reason,
see infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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competition that they are deemed illegal without an inquiry.48 The
Supreme Court has applied per se illegality to tying arrange-
ments, 49 division of markets5 ° and group boycotts.5'
Until the late 1960s, the per se approach dominated the anti-
trust landscape. 52 The high watermark was the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 53 in which the
Court applied the per se rule to non-price vertical restrictions5 4 im-
posed by a supplier on its distributors. 55
48. See Blechman, supra note 47, at 12. "[Tihere are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming value are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore ille-
gal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the busi-
ness excuse for their use." See id. (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
49. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 8 (1958). The tying
arrangement in this case was a "preferential routing" clause in sales contracts and
leases. See id. at 3. Between 1864 and 1870, Congress granted Northern Pacific 40
million acres of land. See id. at 2-3. When Northern Pacific sold or leased this
land, they included a "preferential routing" clause in the contracts. See id. at 3.
This clause forced the grantee or lessee to ship all commodities manufactured or
produced on the land via Northern Pacific when the rates were equal to compet-
ing carriers. See id.
50. SeeAddyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 244 (1899).
The agreement in Addyston specified that six defendants would not compete in 36
states and territories. See id. at 213.
51. See Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68
(1941). Members of the Fashion Originators' Guild (Guild) cooperated in a boy-
cott by refusing to sell to retailers who also sold garments that copied designs of
Guild members. See id. at 461. Over 12,000 retailers signed agreements to partici-
pate in the boycott, though more than half were essentially coerced out of the fear
that Guild members would not sell to them if they did not cooperate. See id. at 461-
62.
52. See Thomas Piraino, Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VArNm. L. Rxv. 1753, 1755 (1994). The main reason
for the early dominance of the per se rule was its simplicity. See id. at 1756. The
rule served as a deterrent to anticompetitive conduct because businesses were
aware that certain types of activity should be avoided. See id. When the rule failed
to deter, this simplicity saved judicial resources due to shorter, less expensive trials.
See id.
Despite its dominance, the per se rule was subjected to some heavy criticism.
See id. Opponents viewed its simplicity as rigidity. See id. The rule's blanket prohi-
bition of certain conduct, without examining its economic impact, deterred both
beneficial and harmful practices. See id. Some antitrust commentators were trou-
bled by such a rule that banned a restraint, even if that restraint actually promoted
economic efficiency. See id. at 1756-57.
53. 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
54. Examples of non-price vertical restrictions include customer and territo-
rial restraints, location clauses, areas of primary responsibility and profit pass-over
agreements. See Kristen Emigholz, Vertical Restrictions and Arrangements, 865 PLI/
CoRP. 105, 134-35 (1994).
55. See Piraino, supra note 52, at 1756. The Court rejected Schwinn's attempt
to sell bicycles to a distributor subject to territorial limitations upon resale. See
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A decade later, the per se approach began to lose favor, as evi-
denced by the Supreme Court's reversal of Schwinn in Continental
T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.5 6 The Court decided that non-price
vertical restrictions should be evaluated under the Rule of Rea-
son.57 The Court acknowledged that, while the provision restricted
intrabrand competition among sellers of Sylvania televisions, it pro-
moted interbrand competition as a whole.5 8 In changing to the
Rule of Reason analysis, the Court stated that "[d] eparture from
the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable eco-
nomic effect rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing."59
Since GTE Sylvania, the per se approach has suffered a steady
erosion in favor of the Rule of Reason. 60 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,61 the Court indicated a willing-
ness to apply the Rule of Reason to a price-fixing agreement. 62 The
Court determined that a fixed common price for the licensing of
musical compositions was not a per se violation of Section 1.63 In
Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 379. The Court found such an agreement to be clearly de-
structive to competition and therefore per se invalid. See id. According to the
Court, the restriction was unreasonable since the manufacturer no longer retains
dominion over the product or risk of loss once the product is sold to a distributor.
See id.
56. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
57. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58. The disputed restriction was a con-
tractual requirement that forced distributors to sell Sylvania televisions only from
authorized locations. See id. at 38.
58. See id. at 54-55. Such restrictions allow manufacturers to "achieve certain
efficiencies in the distribution of ... products." Id. at 54.
59. Id. at 58-59. The Court cited three important factors in abandoning the
per se rule for vertical restrictions. See id. at 57-58. First, there is widespread use of
various forms of vertical restrictions in the United States economy. See id. at 57.
Second, the weight of scholarly and judicial authority indicated that such restric-
tions served an economic purpose. See id. at 57-58. Finally, there was no showing
that Sylvania's agreements would have a "pernicious effect on competition." Id. at
58.
60. See Piraino, supra note 52, at 1757-58. For a discussion of the advantages
and drawbacks of the per se rule, see supra note 52.
61. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
62. See Piraino, supra note 52, at 1758. According to the Court, the rigid per
se analysis should be ignored in favor of examining whether the restraint "appears
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and de-
crease output." Broadcast, 441 U.S. at 19-20.
63. See id. at 24-25. In Broadcast, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS)
sued the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), claiming that blanket licenses constituted illegal
price fixing. See id. at 4.
ASCAP is organized as a clearing house for copyright holders. See id. at 5.
Each of its 22,000 members grants it nonexclusive rights to license their works. See
id. ASCAP then issues licenses and pays its members royalties according to a sched-
ule that takes several factors into consideration. See id. BMI, which represents
10,000 publishing companies and 20,000 authors and composers, functions in a
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upholding the restriction under the Rule of Reason, the Court de-
termined that the common license permitted more efficient mar-
keting of compositions.64 The Court has also applied the Rule of
Reason to other cases which previously warranted a per se
analysis. 65
Most courts examine competitive restraints under Section 1 us-
ing the Rule of Reason. 66 When using the Rule of Reason, "the
factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding
whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an
unreasonable restraint on competition."67 The four primary factors
that courts typically focus on are: effect on intrabrand competition,
effect on interbrand competition, market share and the business
objectives of the supplier.68
The "quick look" approach is another analytical tool which has
developed in recent years as an intermediate standard between per
very similar way. See id. Almost all domestic copyrighted compositions are stored
by ASCAP, which has three million, and BMI, which has one million. See id.
Each organization uses blanket licenses, which CBS alleged to be price fixing.
See id. A blanket license gives the licensee the right to perform "any and all of the
compositions owned by the members or affiliates as often as the licensees desire
for a stated term." Id. The fee for a blanket license is a percentage of total reve-
nues or a flat fee and does not depend on the amount or type of music used. See
id.
64. See id. at 20. The Court acknowledged that the blanket license was a crea-
ture of necessity. See id. With thousands of users and copyright holders and mil-
lions of compositions, the blanket license was the only way to permit "unplanned,
rapid, and indemnified access" to compositions, while at the same time protecting
the copyright holder. Id. The blanket license avoided the prohibitive cost of indi-
vidual transactions and monitoring. See id. In addition, the Court recognized that
an individualized fee for a blanket license would result in the need for a compli-
cated fee schedule and would also produce reporting problems. See id.
65. See Piraino, supra note 52, at 1758-59 (citing National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (price and output restrictions);
Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284
(1985) (group boycotts); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984) (tying arrangements)).
66. See id.
67. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). Jus-
tice Brandeis elaborated on some of the relevant considerations:
[T] he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be at-
tained, are all relevant facts.
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
68. See Barbara A. Reeves et al., Vertical Restrictions, 915 PLI/Co"as. 9, 34
(1996). The business objectives of the supplier are relevant to determine whether
there are legitimate justifications for the restraint. See id. The threshold question
is usually the existence of market power. See id.
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se illegality and the full Rule of Reason analysis. 69 While the quick
look approach originated in one of Chief Justice Burger's dissent-
ing opinions, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) v. Board of
Regents7" is commonly cited to demonstrate its analysis. 71 Under
this approach, there is an initial presumption that the restraint im-
pairs competition. 72 The court then takes a quick look at the justifi-
cations for the restraint.73 If the court is satisfied after this quick
look that the justifications are legitimate, a full Rule of Reason anal-
ysis is conducted.74 The quick look approach permitted the
Supreme Court to take a longer look at the conduct in NCAA,
which it would normally have condemned under the per se ap-
proach. 75 After the Court determined that the justifications war-
ranted further consideration, the Court examined the facts of the
case and found the agreement to be anti-competitive. 76
69. See Jay P. Yancey, Is the Quick Look Too Quick ?: Potential Problems with the
Quick Look Analysis of Antitrust Litigation, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 671, 672 (1996).
70. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
71. SeeYancey, supra note 69, at 678, 681. ChiefJustice Burger first advocated
the quick look approach in his dissent from United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 613 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). SeeYancey, supra note 69, at
678. In Topco, ChiefJustice Burger did not think it was appropriate to condemn an
.agreement among several small grocery chains to join in a cooperative endeavor"
under a per se rule. Topco, 405 U.S. at 613 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger
thought the Court should not formulate "per se rules with no justification other
than the enhancement of predicatiblity and the reduction of judicial investiga-
tion." Id. at 622.
72. See Yancey, supra note 69, at 679. The quick look approach actually has
two variations. See id. With both approaches there is an initial presumption that
the restraint impairs competition. See id.
73. See id. The first variation of the quick look approach functions as a bur-
den shifting device. See id. The initial presumption shifts the burden to the de-
fendant to demonstrate procompetitive benefits sufficient to justify the presumed
anticompetitive effects. See id. In the second variation, the court's quick look is
based on the arguments alone. See id.
74. See id. at 679-80. The court must not only be satisfied that the justifica-
tions are legitimate, but they must also be capable of proof. See id. at 680.
75. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100. In NCAA, the Board of Regents of the Univer-
sity of Oklahoma challenged a NCAA television plan in which all teams received
the same fee for a televised game. See id. at 93. The fee did not increase with
viewing audience, the number of markets in which the game is broadcast, or the
caliber of teams. See id.
The Court acknowledged that this type of horizontal price fixing was usually
condemned using the per se rule. See id. at 100. According to the Court, "what is
critical is that this case involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on com-
petition are essential if the product is to be available at all." Id. at 101.
76. See Yancey, supra note 69, at 681 (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104-13).
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3. Single Entities
To establish a violation under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, a
plaintiff must prove not only that the restraint is unreasonable, but
also that there was a plurality of actors involved, acting "in a con-
certed manner to impose the restraint."77 Section 1 does not pro-
hibit anti-competitive action by a single entity.78 Section 2 of the
Sherman Act applies to action by a single entity, which is only un-
lawful if it "threatens actual monopolization." 79 Thus, a single firm
is not in violation of Section 1, even if it appears to unreasonably
restrain trade.80
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 81 the Supreme
Court rejected, in part, the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 2
The Court held that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary had
to be viewed as a single firm because they had a "complete unity of
interest."83 The Court limited its holding to a parent and wholly
owned subsidiary, so it is unclear whether this analysis applies to
affiliated corporations that the parent does not wholly own.8 4
Those who argue that a league is a single entity believe that the
Court's rationale in Copperweld should be extended to professional
sports leagues.85
77. Michael L. Denger & M. Sean Royall, Vertical Price, Customer and Territorial
Limitations, 941 PLI/CoRP. 663, 665 (1996).
78. See id.
79. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767
(1984). For the facts of Copperweld, see infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
80. See id.
81. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
82. See Thomas W. McNamara, Defining a Single Entity for Purposes of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act Post Copperweld: A Suggested Approach, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1245,
1247. The Supreme Court, in what is termed the "intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine," had traditionally treated parent companies and their subsidiaries as sepa-
rate entities. See id. at 1246.
83. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771. In Copperweld, Lear Siegler, Inc. (Lear) oper-
ated Regal Tube Co. (Regal) as an unincorporated division. See id. at 756. David
Grohne served as president of this division, which manufactured structural steel
tubing. See id. at 755-56. Copperweld Corp. (Copperweld) acquired Regal from
Lear in 1972. See id. at 756. As part of the transaction, Lear and its subsidiaries
were not allowed to compete with Regal in the United States for five years. See id.
Grohne, who took a position with Lear prior to the sale of Regal, established his
own steel tubing company, Independence Tubing Corp. (Independence) while he
was still working for Lear. See id. Independence entered into a contract with
Yoder Co. to construct a tubing mill. See id. Copperweld and Regal sent Yoder a
threatening letter, which resulted in Yoder repudiating its contract. See id. at 757.
In addition, Copperweld attempted to discourage banks and real estate firms from
doing business with Independence. See id.
84. See McNamara, supra note 82, at 1247.
85. See David L. Anderson, The Sports Broadcasting Act: Calling It What It Is -
Special Interest Legislation, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ErNr. L.J. 945, 951-52 (1995). The
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Circuits are split as to whether a professional sports league is a
single entity that is subject only to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, or
ajoint venture that must be analyzed under Section l's Rule of Rea-
son. 86 The majority of courts that have considered this issue have
characterized professional sports leagues as joint ventures.8 7
Although other sources support the single entity position, only one
circuit has followed it.8 8
The Second Circuit was the first circuit to analyze a profes-
sional sports league and conclude that it was a joint venture. 89 In
North American Soccer League v. NFL,90 the North American Soccer
League (NASL) challenged an NFL provision which prohibited
NFL team owners from owning other major professional sports
league teams.91 In characterizing the NFL as an "unincorporated
joint venture consisting of 28 individually owned separate profes-
sional football teams, each operated through a distinct corporation
or partnership," the court focused on the teams' independent eco-
nomic interests. 92 The court concluded that the cross-ownership
supporters of the single entity theory argue that while the teams are separately
owned, the teams share a "unity of interest" due to the desire to promote league
competition and to preserve the economic well being of every team. See id. at 952-
53.
86. See, e.g., Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994) (joint venture). But
see, Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n (PGA) of America,
Inc., 52 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 1995) (single entity).
87. See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); Los Angeles Mem'l Coli-
seum Comm'n v. National Football League (NFL), 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984);
North Am. Soccer League (NASL) v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Smith v.
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
88. See Seabury Management, Inc. v. PGA of America, Inc., 878 F. Supp. 771
(D. Md. 1994), affd in relevant part, 52 F.3d 322 (4th Cir. 1995). See also, Brown v.
Pro Football, 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996); NFL v. North American Soccer League, 459
U.S. 1074, 1077 (1982) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (opposing denial of
certiorari).
89. See North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982). The
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia reached a similar conclusion three years
earlier. SeeSmith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
court stated "[t] he clubs operate basically as a joint venture." Id. The court did
not, however, go into an extensive analysis to reach this conclusion; instead, it only
cited a couple of cases and articles as support for its proposition. See id. at 1179
n.19.
90. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982).
91. See NASL, 670 F.2d at 1250. This "cross-ownership ban" began as an un-
written policy of the NFL commissioner in the 1950's. See id. at 1254. This policy
was reduced to writing in 1967. See id. Finally, in 1978, the NFL owners attempted
to amend the NFL by-laws to force NFL owners to divest their soccer holdings. See
id.
92. Id. at 1251-52. The court noted that teams do not share expenses, capital
expenditures or profits. See id. In addition, each team has independent sources of
revenue, including local TV and radio revenues, parking and concessions. See id.
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ban substantially restrained competition, thus violating the Rule of
Reason. 93
In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL,94 the Ninth
Circuit emphasized the independent nature of each team in its de-
termination that the NFL was a joint venture. 95 The Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Commission challenged a rule which required
three-quarters of the teams to approve a team's move into another
team's home territory.96 Initially, the court rejected the NFL's ar-
gument that the teams must cooperate in order to produce NFL
football.97 In rejecting the NFL's single entity defense, the court
emphasized that each team has independent management policies
in addition to the off-field competition for players, coaches and
management personnel.98
Similarly, the First Circuit focused on off-field competition be-
tween teams.99 In Sullivan v. NFL,1°° the owner of the New England
Patriots, William Sullivan, sued the NFL, claiming that an NFL ban
on the sale of publicly traded stock violated the Sherman Act.10 1
The court also acknowledged that the cross-ownership ban was proposed
largely to protect the Philadelphia Eagles and Minnesota Vikings, who were suffer-
ing financially due to the increased prominence of the NASL Philadelphia Atoms
and Minnesota Kicks. See id. at 1254. The Philadelphia Atoms were leading the
NASL in attendance, while the Eagles lost money from 1969-74 and from 1976-77.
See id. Minnesota Vikings owner, Max Winter, said that the Kicks were "drawing
very well" and hurting his team in terms of media exposure and fan participation.
Id. For these reasons the court concluded that the "NFL teams are separate eco-
nomic entities engaged in a joint venture." Id. at 1252.
93. See id. at 1261. The court remanded the case so that the district court
could enter a permanent injunction against the cross-ownership ban. See id. at
1262.
94. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).
95. See id. at 1390.
96. See id. at 1385. The challenged provision was Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the
NFL Constitution. See id. at 1384. The Oakland Raiders' lease with the Oakland
Coliseum had expired in 1978. See id. at 1385. The Raiders, and managing gen-
eral partner Al Davis, approached the Los Angeles Coliseum concerning a poten-
tial move to Los Angeles. See id. Upon reaching an agreement to move, Davis
announced the plans at a NFL meeting. See id. The NFL teams voted against the
plan 22-0, with five teams abstaining. See id.
97. See id. at 1389. The court noted that "[t]he necessity that otherwise in-
dependent businesses cooperate has not, however, sufficed to preclude scrutiny
under § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id.
98. See id. In addition, teams that are close to each other compete for fan
support, local television and radio revenue and media space. See id.
99. See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1098-99. (1st Cir. 1994).
100. 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
101. See id. at 1094. Article 3.5 of the NFL Constitution requires three-
quarters of team owners to approve any transfer of team ownership interests, ex-
cept transfers within a family. See id. In addition to this provision, the NFL has an
uncodified policy against a sale to the public in the form of publicly traded stock.
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The court rejected the NFL's argument that Copperweld Corp. v. Inde-
pendence Tube Corp.102 establishes the NFL as a single entity.10 3 Ac-
cording to the court, the degree of off-field competition between
teams indicated that the NFL was not a single entity.
10 4
While no circuit has held a traditional sports league to be a
single entity, the Fourth Circuit found a professional sports associa-
tion to be a single entity in Seabury Management, Inc. v. Professional
Golfers' Ass'n.105 The district court concluded that the Professional
Golfers' Association (PGA) and its Middle Atlantic Section
(MAPGA) were a single entity under Coppenweld.106 The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's findings in an unreported
opinion. 10 7
Despite the lack of precedential support, there is additional
persuasive authority that supports the single entity view of a profes-
sional sports league. Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting from the
denial of certiorari in NFL v. NASL,108 believed that competition
between teams off the field was "rare," and aside from the competi-
tion between two teams in one city,109 the league competes as a
See id. Team owners, however, have full authority to approve any transfer by the
requisite three-quarters vote. See id.
At one point Sullivan believed he had 17 of the 21 votes necessary, with seven
more owners still undecided. See id. at 1096. NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle in-
formed Sullivan that league approval was "very dubious." Id. The owners never
voted because Sullivan claimed it would have been futile. See id.
102. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
103. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1099. According to the court, in Copperweld,
although the subsidiary was a legally distinct entity, it had the same interests. See
id. The court distinguished the case at hand, noting that NFL teams compete in
several ways off the field, indicating that the teams have different interests, unlike
the subsidiary in Copperweld. See id.
104. See id. The court stated that it was "well established" that NFL teams
compete off the field for fan support, players, coaches, ticket sales, local broadcast
revenues and the sale of team merchandise. Id. at 1098.
105. Nos. 94-1814, 94-1688, 1995 WL 241379, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 1995),
affig, 878 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994).
106. See Seabury, 878 F. Supp. at 777. The district court determined that the
PGA and MAPGA functioned as a single economic unit. See id. In reaching this
conclusion, the court noted that even though each PGA Section had its own reve-
nues, by-laws, elected officers and programs designed to only benefit the Section,
the Sections' actions must receive final approval from the PGA. See id. at 778. In
addition, the court found it "significant" that each Section was "governed by the
PGA Constitution, by policies adopted either at PGA annual meetings or by the
PGA Board of Directors, and by other pertinent policy documents, such as trade-
mark licensing agreements." Id. at 777.
107. See Seabuiy, Nos. 94-1814, 94-1688, 1995 WL 241379, at *3.
108. 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
109. New York has two professional football teams, the Giants and Jets, while
Los Angeles was home to the Rams and Raiders at the time this case was decided.
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"unit against other forms of entertainment."' 10  In addition, the
Supreme Court has hinted, in dicta, at support for the single entity
construction.11'
B. Sports Broadcasting Act
In 1961, Congress enacted the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA)
as a statutory exemption to the antitrust laws. 112 Congress passed
the SBA to counteract the effects of United States v. NFL," 3 which
invalidated a contract between the NFL and the Columbia Broad-
casting System (CBS)." 4 The SBA permits a league to negotiate a
single television contract on behalf of its teams without the scrutiny
of the antitrust laws. 1" 5 In addition to overruling United States v.
NFL, Congress intended to protect small-market teams that lacked
Both teams have subsequently left Los Angeles, for St. Louis and Oakland
respectively.
110. Id. at 1077 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
111. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (1996). The Court
acknowledged that teams in a professional sports league depend on some coopera-
tion for economic survival. See id. Reflecting on this fact, the Court said "that
circumstance makes the league more like a single bargaining employer. . ... " Id.
The Court said no more on this issue, because it was irrelevant to the case before
them. See id.
112. See David L. Anderson, The Sports Broadcasting Act: Calling It What It Is -
Special Interest Legislation, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 945, 946 (1995). Section
1 provides in pertinent part:
The antitrust laws.., shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among
persons engaged in or conducting the organized professional team sports
of football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs
participating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey con-
tests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such
league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of foot-
ball, baseball, basketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or
conducted by such clubs.
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). Section 2 provides:
Section 1291 of this title shall not apply to any joint agreement described
in the first sentence in such Section which prohibits any person to whom
such rights are sold or transferred from televising any games within any
area, except within the home territory of a member club of the league on
a day when such club is playing a game at home.
Id. § 1292 (1988).
113. 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
114. See NFL, 196 F. Supp. at 447. The invalidated contract would have dra-
matically altered the previous arrangement in the NFL. See id. at 446. Prior to the
1961 contract, each team sold its own television rights. See id. The new agreement
provided that all teams in the league would pool their television rights, giving the
league Commissioner authority to sell the package of television rights. See id. at
447. The court interpreted this contract as eliminating competition among the
teams regarding the sale of television rights and struck down the contract. See id.
115. SeeJulie A. Garcia, The Future of Sports Merchandise Licensing, 18 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 219, 239 (1995).
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sufficient bargaining power to negotiate favorable television
contracts. 1
16
After its passage in 1961, the SBA went virtually unchallenged
until the late-1980s.117 The few cases that did arise under this Act
involved "tangential" issues, including the formation of rival sports
teams or leagues, blackout provisions and related exemptions from
antitrust law. 118 The lawsuit filed in 1990 by the Chicago Bulls is
considered the first significant challenge to the Act." 9
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
In Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. National Basketball
Association (NBA I-A),120 the Seventh Circuit addressed two princi-
pal issues. First, the court considered whether the SBA, an exemp-
tion from antitrust law, applied to the NBC-NBA television
contract.121 Second, the court considered whether the NBA is a
single entity, exempt from Section 1 of the Sherman Act, or a joint
venture subject to Section 1 liability. 122 The Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the NBA may be characterized as a single entity for
some purposesand a joint venture for others.123
1. The Sports Broadcasting Act
The Seventh Circuit first considered whether the Sports Broad-
casting Act exception to the antitrust laws applied.124 The court
noted that the NBA's initial contract failed to satisfy Section 1 be-
cause the Act only applied to "transfers" of broadcast rights. 125 The
court found that the 1993 contract, written with that distinction in
mind, met the conditions of Section 1.126
116. See id.
117. See Goodman, supra note 20, at 485.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
121. See id. at 596.
122. See id. at 596-600. For the pertinent text of Section 1, see supra note 37.
123. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 600.
124. See id. at 596.
125. See id.
126. See id. In the new contract, the league took title of the copyright inter-
ests from the games and transferred all broadcast rights to NBC. See id. The NBA
then received some of the broadcasting rights back, subject to contractual restric-
tions. See id.
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Although Section 1 had been satisfied, the court determined
that Section 2 had not been satisfied, and therefore the antitrust
laws applied. 12 7 By attempting to restrict telecasts to the teams'
home markets, the NBA-NBC contract violated Section 2, which in
turn made Section 1 inapplicable. 128 The court pointed out that
because the Sports Broadcasting Act is a special-interest exception
to the antitrust laws it receives a "beady-eyed reading."' 2 9 The court
acknowledged that the NBA had "understandable and proper" busi-
ness reasons for writing the contract the way it did, but the Sports
Broadcasting Act exception did not apply, so antitrust laws were in
effect.' 3 0
2. Sherman Act
The Seventh Circuit identified three issues that its 1992 deci-
sion left unresolved.' 3 ' The NBA did not appeal whether there was
an antitrust injury, so the court did not discuss this issue.'3 2 The
other two issues concerned the NBA's status as a single entity and
its ability to collect a fee for games broadcast on superstations. 133
a. Waiver
As an initial matter, the court ruled against the Bulls' assertion
that the single entity argument was forfeited because of its omission
from the first appeal.1 34 The court rejected this argument because
127. See NBA II-A, 95 F.3d at 596.
128. See id.
129. Id. The court stated that the league had "to jump through every hoop;
partial compliance doesn't do the trick." Id.
130. Id. The court noted that the Sports Broadcasting Act would have applied
if the league had assumed licensing and then sold the rights to Bulls games to a
local Chicago station, instead of WGN. See id. In addition, the Act itself offered
other options. See id. According to the court, the league chose not to pursue these
options for tax reasons and because there is greater responsibility as a licensor, as
opposed to a regulator. See id.
131. See id.
132. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 596. The court hinted that the NBA would have
lost this issue anyway, noting parenthetically that the Bulls and WGN suffer injury
in fact. See id.
133. See id. In its initial appearance before the Seventh Circuit, the NBA did
not raise the single entity argument, however, on remand the NBA did argue that
it was a single entity, and should therefore be able to collect a fee like other licen-
sors of entertainment products. See id. In addition, the league's Board of Gover-
nors adopted a rule requiring a fee for games licensed to superstations. See id.
This fee would be based on the fee that the two Turner stations pay for games
licensed directly from the league. See id.
134. See id.
1998]
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of the ramifications it would have on other complex cases. 13 5 In
addition, the court noted that its prior decision had stated that the
issue would be available later in the litigation.13 6
b. Fees
The court next turned to the issue of a fee for games broadcast
on superstations.13 7 After briefly describing the district court's de-
cision to cut the proposed NBA fee, the court held that the district
court had improperly cut the fee.138 In examining the fee, the
court focused on output, which it said was the "core question" in
antitrust.13 9 Acknowledging that a high price is not necessarily in-
dicative of a violation of the Sherman Act, the court concluded that
the NBA fee would not reduce output1 40 Because there were no
antitrust issues relating to the fee, the court was obliged to respect
the NBA's decision.' 4 '
135. See id. at 596-97. The court remarked on how quickly the case had
progressed, noting that the case initially went to trial and decision in seven weeks.
See id. The court was concerned that, by denying the NBA the chance to pursue
the single-entity issue, defendants in other complex cases would "drag their heels"
to make sure that all possible issues had been covered. Id. at 597. The court con-
cluded that this result would not benefit anyone. See id.
136. See id. After first noting that parts of the NBA's brief "verged" on argu-
ing the NBA is a single entity, the court concluded that "it would be imprudent to
decide the question after such cursory dialog. Perhaps the parties will join issue
more fully in the proceedings still to come in the district court." NBA I-A, 961 F.2d
at 673.
137. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 597.
138. See id. The court held that the fee was invalid because it was excessive.
See id. The NBA calculated the fee by starting with the fee that it charged the
Turner stations, $450,000 per game. See id. Then the NBA reduced the fee to
reflect the fewer cable stations that carry WGN. See id. The judge, however, started
with advertising revenues WGN generated from retransmission on cable and cut
that figure in half so that the Bulls could keep "their share" of the revenues. Id. As
a result of this recalculation, the fee was cut from $138,000 to $39,400. See id.
The court analogized the district court's opinion to that of an agency with the
power to regulate rates. See id. The court ruled that this was improper, stating that
"antitrust laws do not deputize district judges as one-man regulatory agencies." Id.
139. Id.
140. See id. The court pointed out that even though the Bulls complain that
the fee is excessive and unfair, they still want to broadcast 30 games, or more if
they are allowed. See id. The court also noted that WGN receives other benefits
which compensate for the high fee: "(i) the presence of Bulls games may increase
the number of cable systems that carry the station, augmenting its revenues 'round
the clock; (ii) WGN slots into Bulls games ads for its other programming; and (iii)
many viewers will keep WGN on after the game and watch whatever comes next."
Id.
141. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 597. The court analogized decisions of a league's
internal governance to the decisions of a corporation's board of directors. See id.
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20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss1/6
THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT
c. Single Entity Argument
The court began its analysis of the single entity issue by exam-
ining the NBA's arguments. 142 The NBA argued that, although it
consists of twenty-nine teams and the national organization, it cre-
ates a single product, NBA Basketball. 143 This product competes
with other basketball leagues, sports and forms of entertainment.1 4 4
Separate ownership provides a powerful interest to field better
teams, which increases competition in the league. 145 According to
the NBA, antitrust law encourages cooperation within an organiza-
tion to increase its competitiveness with other organizations and
products.146
Next, the court considered the district court's decision that
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits almost all cooperation be-
tween separately incorporated firms. 147 The district court con-
cluded that the only cooperation allowed, according to Coppenweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 148 was when there is a "complete
unity of interest."'149 The appellate court conceded that this phrase
appeared in Copperweld, but dismissed its application to antitrust law
as "silly."'15 The court noted that a single firm may have many com-
peting interests,' 5 ' but that does not mean that its actions must be
justified under the Rule of Reason. 152
The court characterized Copperweld as distinguishing between
unilateral and concerted actions, and concluded the parent-subsidi-
142. See id. at 597-98.
143. See id. at 597.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 597-98.
146. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 598. The NBA compared itself to the producers
of Star Trek. See id. The producers may decide to release two episodes a week and
grant exclusive licenses to show them, even though it reduces output. See id. Ac-
cording to the NBA, this situation is no different than its licensing of games selec-
tively to superstations. See id.
147. See id.
148. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). For a discussion of Copperweld, see supra notes 81-85
and accompanying text.
149. NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 598 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771).
150. Id. The court distinguished the phrase by noting that the Supreme
Court "offered it as a statement of fact about the parent-subsidiary relation, not as
a proposition of law about the limits of permissible cooperation." Id.
151. See id. For example, the first division might want to sell its products on
the market to increase revenue, which in turn would boost the salary and bonus of
division managers, while the second division would prefer to buy its inputs from
the first division at a low price, thereby maximizing its profits. See id.
152. See id. The Rule of Reason analysis under Section 1 does not apply to a
single entity. See Denger and Royall, supra note 77, at 665.
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ary relationship belongs on the unilateral side. 153 Concerted action
is found when conduct "deprives the marketplace of the independ-
ent centers of decision making that competition assumes" without
the efficiencies associated with firm integration. 154 Some entities,
such as mergers, joint ventures and various vertical agreements, are
somewhere in between these two extremes and should be assessed
under the Rule of Reason. 155 Using this framework, the court con-
cluded that the NBA could be considered a single firm.1 5 6
The court then attempted to classify the NBA as either a joint
venture or a single-entity, acknowledging that it had characteristics
of both. 157 First, the court distinguished the NBA from the Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), an organization
Which the Supreme Court has characterized as a joint venture. 158
The NBA has no existence apart from sports: only the NBA can
make "NBA Basketball" games, and only the NBA can "make"
teams.' 59 According to the court, each of these characteristics
makes the NBA appear like a single firm. 160 In addition, from the
perspective of fans and advertisers, "NBA Basketball" is one product
originating from a single source. 161 Yet, a college basketball player,
who seeks to sell his skills, perceives NBA teams as distinct.162 Fi-
nally, the court noted that the Supreme Court had a difficult time
fitting the National Football League into one of the two
categories. 163
153. See NBA Il-A, 95 F.3d at 598.
154. Id. (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769).
155. See id.
156. See id. at 598-99. Based on the preceding analysis of Copperweld, the court
concluded that the district court's legal standard was wrong and its judgment
flawed. See id.
157. See NBA lI-A, 95 F.3d at 599. A single-entity is analyzed under Section 2
of the Sherman Act, while a joint venture must undergo the Rule of Reason analy-
sis of Section 1. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. Since the start of this litigation, two teams were added, the To-
ronto Raptors and Vancouver Grizzlies. See id. The teams consisted of players
from the existing teams and additional draft picks. See id.
160. See id.
161. See id. This is true even though teams such as the Chicago Bulls and
Seattle Supersonics are "highly distinguishable." Id. In the same way, General Mo-
tors is a single firm, although the Corvette and Chevrolet are very different cars.
See id.
162. See NBA Il-A, 95 F.3d at 599. In addition, the difficulty in transferring
skills in basketball to another sport makes the "league look like a group of firms
acting as a monopoly." Id.
163. See id. (citing Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2126 (1996)).
The Court, in Brown, acknowledged that teams in a professional sports league are
not entirely independent economic competitors, since some cooperation is re-
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The court next examined the way other circuits have treated
various sports leagues.1 64 First, the court noted that its role was one
of deferential appellate review, and therefore it could not choose
one interpretation over the other since that was the duty of the dis-
trict court.16 5 While most courts have preferred the joint venture
characterization of sports leagues, 166 both the Professional Golf As-
sociation (PGA) and an electric cooperative were found to be single
firms, even though they were less integrated than the NBA.1 67 In
addition, the court cited a "strong dissent" from the denial of certi-
orari by Justice Rehnquist who argued that the North American
Soccer League was a single firm.'68
After considering the parties' arguments and judicial prece-
dent, the court concluded that Coppenweld does not impose one
"right" characterization. 169 The court determined that, due to the
diversity of sports, the analysis should be undertaken "one league at
a time."170 The court went further, however, and suggested that the
analysis could occur "one facet of a league at a time.' 7 1 As a result,
the court explicitly left open the possibility that the NBA was a sin-
gle firm when licensing broadcasting rights and a joint venture
quired if the league is to survive. See Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2126. Although not
confronted with the single entity issue, the Court did say that the NFL seemed
more like a single bargaining employer. See id.
164. See id. For a discussion of the judicial treatment of professional sports
leagues, see supra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
165. See id. The NBA had urged the court to reach a decision, following six
years of litigation on the subject. See id.
166. See id. (citing Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994); North Am.
Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum
Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593
F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
167. See NBA II-A, 95 F.3d at 599-600 (citing Seabury Management, Inc. v.
PGA of Am., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1994), affd in relevant part, 52 F.3d 322
(4th Cir. 1995); Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir.
1988)).
In Mt. Pleasant, the rural electric cooperative consisted of three levels. See id.
at 271. The 43 local distribution cooperatives are owned by the members who
receive the electricity. See id. These 43 cooperatives own the six generation-and-
transmission cooperatives (G & Ts) which sell and transport wholesale electricity.
See id. The six G & Ts own Associated Electric Cooperative, which owns almost all
of the electrical generating capacity and all the larger power lines. See id. The
court found this arrangement to be a single entity because the relationship was
entirely interdependent, not independent. See id. at 277.
168. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 599 (citing NFL v. North Am. Soccer League, 459
U.S. 1074, 1077 (1982)).
169. See id. at 600.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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when limiting the competition for players who have few other mar-
ket options. 17 2
The court concluded that the NBA's superstation rules cannot
be condemned without a full Rule of Reason inquiry because the
NBA is sufficiently integrated.1 73 The court noted that it had up-
held the district court's original injunction due to the district
court's characterization of the NBA as a cartel. 174 After the NBA's
latest arguments, the court concluded that the NBA's actions in the
broadcast market were closer to those of a single firm than a group
of independent firms.175 As a result, the court stated that the Bulls
must establish that the NBA has exercised power in a relevant mar-
ket that has injured consumers. 176
In addition, the court briefly discussed market power, which it
noted was an "indispensable ingredient" of every claim under the
Rule of Reason analysis. 177 The NBA argued that it lacks market
power because there is no time slot in which the NBA dominates
and because the season overlaps all the other professional and col-
lege sports.178 The court noted that if the NBA assembled a homo-
geneous audience for advertisers it still might have market power,
even if it was a small portion of air-time. 179 Although both parties
had devoted significant portions of time to this issue at trial, the
judge deemed the issue irrelevant and refused to make findings of
fact on the subject.180 The court ended its discussion by noting that
market power is only irrelevant if the NBA is a single firm under
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,181 but suggested that due
to the difficulty of characterization, it might be better to analyze the
case under the Rule of Reason since market power would be the
172. See id. Using another analogy, the court pointed out that just as McDon-
ald's ability to coordinate the release of a new sandwich does not imply the ability
to agree to a uniform wage for employees, the NBA's ability to agree to a television
contract does not imply an ability to set players' wages. See id.
173. See NBA II-A, 95 F.3d at 600.
174. See id. At that time the NBA had not yet made a Copperweld argument.
See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 600.
179. See id. at 601.
180. See id.
181. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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starting point.182 The Seventh Circuit vacated the decision of the
district court and remanded for further proceedings.18 3
B. Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Judge Cudahy agreed with the majority's
opinion that the "quick look" doctrine did not apply to this case,
but disagreed with the majority on two significant issues. 184 First,
Judge Cudahy contended that the district court was correct when it
examined the NBA's fee for WGN broadcasts of Bulls games. 185 He
also believed that the court should not have even reached the single
entity argument, due to its omission from the prior appeal.18 6
In conclusion, Judge Cudahy offered some thoughts on the
analysis of the single entity argument.1 87 His analysis of the subject
focused on the independent economic interests of the individual
teams.188 He ended his discussion of the single entity issue by criti-
182. See NBA Il-A, 95 F.3d at 601.
183. See id. The court stated that the Bulls and WGN would be bound by the
league's limitations on superstation telecasts until further proceedings were con-
ducted. See id.
Complicating the remand slightly is the fact that the presiding judge died
before the Seventh Circuit decided this latest appeal. See id. The court suggested
that the parties might agree that an assessment of credibility is unnecessary, which
would allow the new judge to base his decision on the transcript, exhibits, stipula-
tions and argument. See id.
184. See id. Judge Cudahy thought the "quick look" approach should have a
narrow application. See id. He noted that it originated in the analysis of the
NCAA, which is much less integrated than the NBA. See id. (citing National Col-
legiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)). According to
Judge Cudahy, the NBA fits in between loose alliances, where anticompetitive
agreements are obvious, and fully integrated entities, which merit far less atten-
tion. See id. For this reason he thought a full Rule of Reason analysis was neces-
sary. See id. at 601-02.
185. See id. at 602. Judge Cudahy was not satisfied with the majority's conclu-
sion that output would not be affected. See id. He thought that cost and output
were related issues in this case. See id. He pointed out that the district court found
as a fact that "[the NBA's proposed fee] may well at some future date decrease
output and distribution of Bulls games on WGN .... " Id. Judge Cudahy noted
that it was difficult to tell if output is reduced because the output is limited to
thirty games, instead of what the market can bear. See id. Judge Cudahy would
have remanded the fee issue as well, because he was not sure if the size of the
district court's adjustment was justified by antitrust considerations alone. See id.
186. See id. Judge Cudahy took issue with the majority's decision to entertain
the single entity argument despite its omission from the previous appeal. See id.
According to Judge Cudahy, the exception announced by the court was without
precedent. See id. He did not understand why defendants in complex cases should
receive preferential treatment. See id. In his opinion, Judge Cudahy felt that the
issue could not be reached at all, despite dicta in the earlier opinion to the con-
trary. See id.
187. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 602-06.
188. See id. at 603.
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cizing two points in the majority's analysis. 189 First, Judge Cudahy
did not believe it was a good idea to "divorce" the issues of single
entity and ownership.190 Second, he disagreed with the majority's
discussion of independent interests. 191
V. CRIInCAL ANALYSis
In NBA I-A, the Seventh Circuit avoided deciding if the NBA is
a single entity or joint venture. 192 To reach this indecisive result,
the Seventh Circuit first had to ignore the principles of waiver and
allow the NBA to raise an argument it had failed to raise in the first
appeal. 193 In concluding that the NBA may be a single entity for
some purposes and a joint venture for others, the Seventh Circuit
has made a disturbing break from several other circuits that have
considered the issue. 194
To reach the single entity argument, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that its omission by the NBA in its previous appeal was ex-
cused.195 The court believed that public policy dictated this result
189. See id. at 605-06.
190. See id. at 605. This separation, according to Judge Cudahy, leads to
"messy and inconsistent application of antitrust law." Id.
191. See id. (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
771 (1984)). Judge Cudahy emphasized that the holding in Coppeneld focused on
the relationship of a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary. See id.
Judge Cudahy disagreed with the majority's example of competing interests in a
firm. See id. at 606. He believed Copperweld focused on the economic interests of
decisionmakers, noting that employees usually do not fit this description. See id.
In Judge Cudahy's opinion, there was a "strong" argument that the NBA was a
joint venture because the teams are individually owned and revenue is not shared
in a fixed proportion. Id These factors allow each team to have independent
economic interests. See id.
192. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 599. The court remanded the case for a third
time. See id. Although the court appreciated the parties' desire for a decision after
six years of litigation, the court could not say that the NBA was a single entity or
joint venture as a matter of law. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited
several conflicting authorities on the issue as evidence that more than one charac-
terization is possible. See id. at 599-600. For a discussion of the conflicting views on
the status of professional sports leagues, see supra notes 87-111 and accompanying
text.
193. See id. The court allowed the NBA to raise the single entity argument,
despite the league's failure to raise the issue during the first appeal before the
Seventh Circuit. See id. at 596-97. According to the court, any other result would
have far reaching consequences for complex litigation. See id. at 597. For a discus-
sion and criticism of the court's decision to ignore the rule of waiver, see infra
notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
194. See id. at 600.
195. See id. at 596-97. The court noted that the case was tried and decided in
a short amount of time, seven weeks. See id. at 596. This was made possible by
"judicial willingness to entertain in subsequent rounds of the case arguments that
could not be fully developed in such short compass." Id. at 597.
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because to rule otherwise would slow down litigation in complex
cases because defendants would be very careful to raise every argu-
ment.196 This result is curious, because it is contrary to the usual
rules applicable to waiver of issues on appeal. 197 In addition, it is
difficult to understand why the NBA, with its many lawyers, should
be given special treatment that a much smaller litigant would not
receive. 198
Next, the Seventh Circuit chose to "straddle the fence" when it
decided that the NBA could be a joint venture in some aspects and
at the same time a single entity in other aspects. 199 This analysis
contradicts that of the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth and District of
Columbia Circuits, which have all classified professional sports
196. See id. at 597. The court was concerned that without such an exception,
defendants in complex cases would "drag their heels in order to ensure that noth-
ing was overlooked, a step that would benefit no one." Id.
Interestingly enough, the court cites Schering Corp. v. Illinois Antibiotics Co.,
89 F.3d 357 (7th Cir. 1996), in conjunction with its decision to hear the previously
omitted single entity argument. See id. In Schering, however, Judge Posner stated
the following rule: "We certainly agree that the failure of an appellee to have
raised all possible alternative grounds for affirming the district court's decision,
unlike an appellant's failure to raise all possible grounds for reversa4 should not operate
as a waiver." Schering, 89 F.3d 357, 358 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). This
case is simply inapplicable, however, because the NBA, having lost initially in dis-
trict court, was the appellant before the Seventh Circuit. See NBA I-A, 961 F.2d 667
(7th Cir. 1992). With this exception unavailable, the NBA must fall within the
general rule, also enunciated by Judge Posner: "A ruling by the trial court, in an
earlier stage of the case, that could have been but was not challenged on appeal is
binding in subsequent stages of the case." Schering, 89 F.3d at 358.
197. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 602 (Cudahy, J., concurring). See, e.g., Thomp-
son v. Boggs, 33 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 1994) (failing to develop argument or cite
legal authority waives issue). The Seventh Circuit failed to follow its own prece-
dent. The court acknowledged that the NBA had failed to develop its argument by
stating:
Parts of the NBA's brief verge on the argument that a sports league is a
single entity as a matter of law .... But the NBA did not contend in the
district court that the NBA is a single entity .... It does no more than
allude to the possibility here. Whether a sports league is a single entity
for antitrust purposes has significance far beyond this case, and it would
be imprudent to decide the question after such cursory dialog.
NBA I-A, 961 F.2d 667, 672-73 (7th Cir. 1992). Having said this, the court ignored
the rules of waiver, saying "[pl erhaps the parties will join issue more fully in the
proceedings still to come in the district court." Id. at 673.
198. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 602. The NBA had at least 21 attorneys working
on this appeal. See id. at 594-95.
199. See id. at 600. The court concluded that the NBA is closer to a single
entity when it acts in the broadcast market but may be a joint venture when it
restricts competition for players. See id. By way of analogy, the court pointed out
that just because McDonald's franchises can coordinate the release of a new
hamburger, it doesn't automatically follow that the franchises can set uniform
wages for certain types of employees. See id. Likewise, the ability of teams to agree
on a television contract does not mean they can set wages for players. See id.
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leagues as either joint ventures or single entities. 200 Each of these
circuits was confronted with a professional sports league that had
characteristics very similar to the NBA.20 1 Unlike these circuits,
however, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the single entity analy-
sis could be performed several times on an individual sports league,
by examining each facet of the league. 20 2
Both the First and Ninth Circuits focused on the significant off-
field competition between teams in concluding that the NFL was a
joint venture.203 The First Circuit noted that NFL teams have di-
verse interests, as evidenced by competition for fan support, play-
ers, coaches, ticket sales, local broadcast revenues and the sale of
team merchandise. 20 4 The Ninth Circuit also focused on each of
these factors, in addition to the independence of each team's
management. 205
The NBA shares almost all of the characteristics of a joint ven-
ture that the First and Ninth Circuits deemed important in deter-
mining that the NFL was a joint venture. 20 6 The district court
found that in addition to head-to-head competition in some geo-
graphic areas, "[a]ll the teams compete for media attention, for
coaching staffs and front office personnel and, with some restraints,
for players."20 7 In addition, each NBA team keeps ninety-four per-
cent of the gate receipts for regular season home games.208 NBA
teams may also keep 100% of local television revenues.20 9 These
200. For a discussion of the various approaches the courts have taken, see
supra notes 77-111 and accompanying text.
201. For a discussion of these characteristics, see infra notes 203-09 and ac-
companying text.
202. See NBA Il-A, 95 F.3d at 600.
203. See Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1098-99 (1st Cir. 1994); Los Angeles
Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d 1381, 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
204. See Sullivan, 34 F.3d at 1098. For the facts and holding of Sullivan, see
supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
205. See LA Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1390. For a discussion of LA Coliseum, see
supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
206. The NBA teams do not compete for merchandise sales. See NBA I, 754 F.
Supp. 1336, 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The teams split proceeds from team merchan-
dise evenly. See id. In 1990, the Bulls sold more merchandise than any other team,
yet they still received 1/27th of the total revenues. See id.
207. Id. at 1341. The head to head competition occurs in the New York re-
gion where the New York Knicks and NewJersey Nets compete and also in the city
of Los Angeles where the Los Angeles Clippers and Los Angeles Lakers play. See
id.
208. See id. The NBA collects only six percent of the gate receipts. See id.
Interestingly, NFL teams split their gate receipts 60-40 between home and away
teams. See id.
209. See id. at 1344. At the time of the first trial, NBA rules permitted teams to
televise "up to half (41) of its regular season games, home or away, over any com-
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examples of off-field competition are almost identical to the factors
the First and Ninth Circuits encountered.
The Seventh Circuit reached the single entity issue by selec-
tively following precedence and judicial procedure.2 10 The court
determined that it must remand the issue, again, because more
than one characterization was possible.2 11 But the Seventh Circuit
did not stop there. Instead of simply remanding the case, the
court, in dicta, chose to leave open the possibility that each facet of
a league must be examined under a Rule of Reason analysis. 2 12 The
court offered no justification for such a position. Nowhere in its
opinion does the Seventh Circuit cite differences between the NFL
and NBA which justify a different approach from that taken by
other circuits. A far cry from offering lower courts an innovative
legal analysis, this decision merely complicates an already difficult
issue.
VI. IMPACT
The result the Seventh Circuit reached in NBA I-A will only
increase litigation in all complex fields. The court carved out a new
exception to the rules of waiver, which would allow a defendant to
raise new issues in subsequent appeals, as long as the case is suffi-
ciently complex.2 13 Such an exception, unique to the Seventh Cir-
cuit, could make it a haven for litigating difficult cases, because the
risks associated with omitting an issue are no longer present.
More specifically, litigation in the antitrust field will increase as
well. A finding that a league is a single entity or joint venture will
not close the issue, because another facet of a league may be vulner-
able to attack. This result could be particularly harmful to the NBA
itself, because even if it were to win on remand, it would merely
close the issue of broadcast rights. The court's dicta could en-
mercial over-the-air television station other than a superstation located in its
'home territory.'" Id.
210. For a discussion of the court's treatment of waiver, see supra notes 195-98
and accompanying text.
211. See NBA II-A, 95 F.3d at 599. This is the third time that the Seventh
Circuit has remanded the case. The court justified this remand by saying "[w] e are
not authorized to announce and apply our own favored characterization unless the
law admits of only one choice." Id.
While correct on this issue, the court's selective application of judicial proce-
dure and precedence is difficult to understand. For a discussion of the court's
mishandling of the waiver issue, see supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
212. See NBA II-A, 95 F.3d at 600.
213. See NBA lI-A, 95 F.3d at 597. For a discussion of the court's handling of
the waiver issue, see supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text.
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courage a college player to challenge the single entity status in rela-
tion to the recruitment of players. 21 4
The single entity issue is having a dramatic impact on the for-
mation of new professional sports leagues. New leagues are being
created as single entities, specifically to avoid the application of an-
titrust laws. 215 Unfortunately, even such precautions cannot protect
a league from litigation, frivolous or otherwise. After Major League
Soccer's first year of operation, ten players have filed suit, alleging
that the league's player restraints violate the antitrust laws.2 16
The split in the circuits, the impact on new leagues and the
amount of money at stake in professional sports all make this issue
ripe for a Supreme Court decision. 21 7 The split in the circuits that
existed prior to this case is now even more alarming, due to the
possibility of multiple characterizations for the same league. Until
the Supreme Court steps in, litigation will proliferate and attorneys
will be forced to contrive new structures to withstand antitrust chal-
lenges. The situation in the Seventh Circuit is more distressing
than most. The NBA, or any other professional sports league, may
find itself in court several different times, on several different is-
sues, attempting to convince a court that a league is a single entity.
Timothy R Deckert
214. See NBA I-A, 95 F.3d at 600.
215. See Stefan Fatsis, Futbol Invades the U.S., WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1996, at B9.
The newest mens' professional soccer league, Major League Soccer (MLS), is col-
lectively owned by six investors, who each paid five million dollars to operate, but
not own, a club. See id. MLS hopes that this single entity structure will allow it to
restrict player salaries while avoiding antitrust litigation. See id. Similarly, the new
womens' professional team, the American Basketball League (ABL), is organized
as a single entity, with the league owning all the clubs. See Donna Carter, League
Boss Refuses to Fear the WNBA, DENr. PosT, Jan. 27, 1997, at C9. This structure will
shield the ABL from antitrust liability, while keeping salaries low to prevent the
league from folding from escalating salaries. See id.
216. See Dan Giesin, Players Group's Lawsuit Challenges MLS Rules, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 14, 1997, at C7.
217. The Chicago Bulls and NBA will not reach the Supreme Court, due to a
settlement late last year. See Chicago Bulls, NBA Reach Pact on Televising Games, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 13, 1996, at B6. Under the terms of the settlement, the Bulls are al-
lowed to televise 15 games a year nationally on WGN. See id. The Bulls will not pay
a fee for these games, but will share the advertising revenue with the league. See id.
In addition, the Bulls may broadcast an unlimited amount of games over WGN in
the Chicago area. See id.
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